

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION**

OLAN WAYNE BRISCOE,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	No. 2:13-CV-6-JCH
)	
CITY OF MOBERLY, et al.,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon the application of Olan Wayne Briscoe for leave to commence this action without payment of the required filing fee. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Upon consideration of the financial information provided with the completed application, the Court finds that plaintiff is financially unable to pay any portion of the filing fee. Therefore, plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis at any time if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or in fact." *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).

In reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); *Scheuer v. Rhodes*, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

The Complaint

Plaintiff seeks monetary relief in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. The named defendants are City of Moberly and Moberly police officers J.J. Baird, A.J. Swon, and A.M. Wheatry. Plaintiff's allegations are substantially similar to those he advanced in two previous lawsuits, which were both dismissed as legally frivolous: *Briscoe v. Baird*, No. 2:12-CV-11-JCH (E.D. Mo.) and *Briscoe v. Director of Revenue, State of Missouri*, No. 2:11-CV-14-AGF (E.D. Mo.).

In the instant action, plaintiff once again alleges that he was arrested on February 13, 2008, for "DWI and resisting arrest." Plaintiff complains that he was forced to spend the night in a cell at the Moberly Police Department, during which, officers

"would rake their batons across the cell bars and kick the cell bars [every twenty minutes] when [he] was asleep." Plaintiff states that this scared him, and he woke up "sore from head to toe" and noticed that he had "numerous bruises." Plaintiff states that he was released the following day, on February 14.

Discussion

I. Section 1983 Claims

Having carefully reviewed plaintiff's allegations, the Court will dismiss defendant City of Moberly pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). Although a municipality is not entitled to absolute immunity in § 1983 actions, it cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory. *Monell v. Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Municipal liability cannot be imposed absent an allegation that unlawful actions were taken pursuant to a municipality's policy or custom. *Id.* at 694. There being no such allegation in the present action, the complaint is legally frivolous as to this defendant.

Plaintiff is suing officers Baird, Swon, and Wheatry in their official capacities. *See Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College*, 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995)(where a complaint is silent about defendant's capacity, Court must interpret the complaint as including official-capacity claims); *Nix v. Norman*, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989). Naming a government official in his or her official capacity is the equivalent of naming the government entity that employs the official. *Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police*,

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). To state a claim against a municipality or a government official in his or her official capacity, a plaintiff must allege that a policy or custom of the government entity is responsible for the alleged constitutional violation. *Monell v. Dep't of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). The instant complaint does not contain any allegations that a policy or custom of a government entity was responsible for the alleged violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights. As a result, the complaint is legally frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

As additional grounds for dismissing this action, the Court finds that plaintiff's allegations simply do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and fail to state a claim under § 1983.

II. Section 1985 and 1986 Claims

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985 concerns conspiracies to interfere with civil rights. Although plaintiff does not specify under which subsection of § 1985 he is proceeding, the Court will liberally construe the allegations under § 1985(3), which provides in pertinent part:

If two or more persons . . . conspire . . . for the purposes of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.

Thus, to state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must establish that (1) he is a member of a class suffering from invidious discrimination; and (2) defendants' actions were motivated by racial animus or some other type of class-based discrimination. *United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott*, 463 U.S. 825, 834-39 (1983); *Griffin v. Breckenridge*, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971) (plaintiff must allege these two elements to state § 1985(3) claim). In the instant action, nothing in the complaint indicates that plaintiff is a member of a protected class or that defendants were motivated by purposeful discrimination. As such, plaintiff's § 1985(3) claims will be dismissed as legally frivolous. Because a § 1986 action is dependent upon the existence of a § 1985 claim, plaintiff's § 1986 claim is also frivolous. *See McIntosh v. Arkansas Republican Party-Frank White Election Committee*, 766 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 1985).

For these reasons, the Court will dismiss this action pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. #2] is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to issue upon the complaint, because the complaint is legally frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [Doc. #4] is **DENIED** as moot.

A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 26th day of February, 2013.

/s/Jean C. Hamilton
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE